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1. Introduction 
 The past few decades have seen that a number of developing countries attempt to 
increase foreign direct investment (FDI) by removing foreign ownership restrictions and 
offering preferential investment incentives for foreign firms. Indeed, prior evidence 
shows that a better investment climate encourages FDI activity (Markusen, 2002; Kinda, 
2010). However, regulatory barriers to foreign investment in developing economies 
remain greater than in developed economies. The average length of the investment 
process for foreign investors was 20 days for high-income economies and 47 days for 
middle- and low-income economies (World Bank Group, 2010). 
Regulatory reforms and discriminatory tax practices for foreign investors are a 
crucial policy issue for governments in developing economies. Although the impact of 
eliminating policy-related obstacles to inward foreign investment is of great interest for 
policy makers, we know little about how policy-driven reductions in investment costs 
will affect FDI decisions differently across individual firms. Reductions in barriers lead 
not only to reallocations of resources across countries but also across individual firms. 
Their different responses carry important implications for both aggregate productivity 
gains and the concentration of production across firms. This paper investigates this issue 
one step further by examining how heterogeneous foreign firms will respond to a 
reduction of policy-specific investment barriers in developing countries.  
 Our task in this paper is to quantify firm-level responses to investment 
liberalization in developing economies. Linking positive aggregate shocks and 
individual firm responses in a standard econometric framework is difficult because of 
the lack of observable natural experiments and difficulty in quantifying barriers to FDI. 
Thus, we employ a structural approach for counterfactual policy experiments by 
drawing on our prior work in Arita and Tanaka (2013a), where a firm-heterogeneity 
model of Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011; EKK hereafter) is calibrated to match 
data on Japanese multinational firms. 
 We consider a hypothetical scenario in which only developing countries reduce 
investment barriers, but investment costs in developed countries remain constant. 
Specifically, we explore two policy experiments: (1) FDI barriers fall to the level of 
investment barriers faced by their domestic firms and (2) FDI barriers decline to the 
level of investment barriers in developed countries. Because the quantitative impact of 
policy changes on FDI barriers is not normally observable, the literature has applied 
ad-hoc reductions to assess the impact of liberalization. For our policy experiments, we 
apply two policy-specific measures of FDI barriers: the length of investment procedures 
for foreign investors and the effective corporate tax rate faced by foreign firms. To link 
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these theoretical measures with actual policy barriers, we relate the fixed cost to the 
length of investment procedures and the variable cost to the corporate tax rates. 
Drawing on the estimated elasticity between FDI costs and actual measures of policy 
barriers, we translate the actual absolute reduction in these policy measures into a 
percentage point change in FDI costs, which will serve as counterfactual scenarios. 
 Comparing the baseline and counterfactual simulations for each policy experiment, 
we can summarize our main findings as follow. First, economies where there is a larger 
reduction in investment barriers tend to experience a welfare gain as measured by a 
change in real wages; the larger inflow of foreign firms contributes to increase nominal 
wages and market competition in local markets. By contrast, economies where there is a 
negligible elimination of investment obstacles could yield a welfare loss because their 
markets may become more unattractive than those of other economies that reduced FDI 
barriers significantly. Second, an improvement of investment processes encourages new 
entry of foreign investors relatively more than a reduction of local tax burdens on 
foreign firms. 
 Finally, this paper examines how different types of FDI barriers and policy 
instruments affect heterogeneous firm activity. di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013) show 
a significant distinction between fixed and variable costs on welfare gains from trade in 
the presence of heterogeneous firms. Chor (2009) demonstrates that subsidies for FDI 
yield different welfare implications between fixed and variables costs of foreign 
production through selection effects of individual firms. Consistent with these studies, 
we find that individual firms respond differently to falling investment costs in 
developing economies. Specifically, an improvement in investment procedures induces 
low productive firms to shrink their foreign production in developing economies for 
intensified competition but induces middle productive firms to increase their entry and 
production there substantially. The most productive firms expand their foreign 
production modestly. The reason is that marginally productive producers below the 
entry threshold of productivity are the primary beneficiaries from lower entry barriers. 
Comparing the type of policy reforms, we find that multinationals expand their entry 
and production in developing economies more substantially following a decline in entry 
barriers than following a decline in corporate tax rates. 
 This paper is related to the empirical studies on the determinants of FDI activity in 
developing economies. Asiedu (2002) examines whether FDI determinants in Africa 
differ from those in other regions. The findings show that return on capital, 
infrastructure development, and FDI openness may affect African countries differently 
than other countries. Kinda (2010) uses a firm-level data set to investigate the impact of 
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investment climate on FDI in developing countries. The results indicate that an 
improvement in physical infrastructure, financial constraints, and institutional barriers 
would encourage FDI activity. Additionally, Harding and Javorcik (2011) provide 
evidence that sector-specific investment promotion increases FDI inflows in developing 
countries, suggesting that the sector-targeting investment incentives are an effective 
policy option. Consistent with these empirical works, our findings imply that investment 
barriers deter foreign firms. By contrast, we extend the evidence by showing a strikingly 
different response of individual firms to a decline in investment costs. 
 Another branch of related studies includes a structural approach to examining the 
impact of investment liberalization. Markusen (1997) and Egger et al. (2007) employ 
the knowledge capital model and analyze the impact of trade and investment 
liberalization on multinational activity and welfare in developing economies. Policy 
experiments are designed to examine a set of different liberalization scenarios at the 
arbitrary level of liberalization in trade and investment. Konan and Maskus (2006) study 
the impact of services liberalization on the Tunisian economy using a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model. Barriers to foreign investment in service sectors are 
modeled as a combination of price wedges in cost inefficiency and market power of 
local firms in the absence of foreign firms. While a removal of these price wedges is 
defined as services liberalization, they rely on crude approximations gathered from 
Tunisian industry studies to set the level for eliminating barriers. Additionally, Burstein 
and Monge-Naranjo (2009) develop a quantitative model to estimate the impact of 
eliminating policy barriers on foreign controls of domestic factors of production in 
developing economies.   
Other works have sought to predict the gains of increased FDI through free trade 
agreements and regional economic integration. Petri et al. (2011) estimate the gains 
from the ASEAN Economic Community with a CGE model. Along with reductions of 
tariffs and non-tariff measures, they simulate improvements in FDI climate and find 
potentially large joint gains from the integration. Using the framework employed in this 
paper, Arita and Tanaka (2013b) simulate the impact of regional economic integration 
on multinational firms in developed and developing countries. However, both of these 
works employ ad-hoc changes in FDI barriers, making it difficult to assess 
policy-specific instruments of investment liberalization. 
While our paper is similar to these previous studies in its structural approach, it 
extends the prior approach by directly linking actual measures of policy barriers with 
theoretical measures of investment costs in the model. To conduct counterfactual 
analysis, it is necessary to identify a change in the underlying costs of FDI activity 
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under certain policy experiments. In the prior work, the magnitude of the cost changes 
is not necessarily determined on the basis of the actual change in policy barriers but is 
set at an arbitrary level. In this respect, we employ actual survey measures for FDI 
barriers and design policy experiments in which a change in underlying FDI costs is 
based on a change in the survey measures. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodological 
framework to conduct the counterfactual analysis. Section 3 discusses policy-related 
barriers on foreign investment, followed by the estimation of a relationship between 
theoretical and survey measures of FDI barriers. Section 4 presents the counterfactual 
results under distinct policy experiments. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 This section presents the theoretical framework for counterfactual experiments. 
While we discuss the key elements of the framework that closely follow EKK (2011), 
we provide a summary of the methodological framework in Appendix A.1 
Based on the EKK model of heterogeneous firms in international trade, we allow 
firms to serve foreign markets solely via local production, i.e., horizontal FDI. By 
excluding the role of trade, we preclude a variety of alternative choices for firms in 
serving abroad.2 However, this simplification enables us to avoid complex firm-level 
decisions and to focus on the choice between home and foreign production. 
The EKK model is based on the monopolistic competition framework. Goods are 
differentiated and a single firm produces a unique good j with efficiency ݖ௜ሺ݆ሻ. There 
are N countries that have a continuum of potential producers. A firm in home country i 
that invests and produces in host country n will incur unit costs: 
ܿ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ௪೙ௗ೙೔௭೔ሺ௝ሻ           (1) 
where ݓ௡ is the factor cost in country n and ݀௡௜ is an iceberg form of efficiency loss 
such as management costs of local plants to implement production technology abroad. A 
firm incurs no additional cost to implement its production technology at home. Since 
each firm receives a random productivity draw from a Pareto distribution, a measure of 
potential producers with efficiency of at least z is as follows: 
μ୧୞ሺZ ൒ zሻ ൌ T୧zି஘,			z ൐ 0       (2) 
where Ti is the average level of efficiency in country i. The parameter θ  is a 
                                                  
1 See further details of the methodology in Arita and Tanaka (2013a). 
2 As multinational firms may engage in exporting, Irarrazabal et al. (2013) consider intra-firm trade 
between parents and their foreign affiliates, whereas Tintelnot (2012) examines exports of foreign 
affiliates. 
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distribution parameter of firm productivities for θ	 ൐ 0. 
 Each country has the standard CES preferences over differentiated goods with the 
elasticity of substitution between any two goods ߪ	 ൐ 1. We obtain a demand function: 
ܺ௡ሺ݆ሻ ൌ 	ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻ ቀ௣೙ሺ௝ሻ௉೙ ቁ
ିሺఙିଵሻ ܺ௡       (3) 
where ܺ௡ሺ݆ሻ is the sales by firm j in country n, ܺ௡ is an aggregate demand for 
manufacturing varieties, and ௡ܲ is the CES price index. We assume ߠ െ 1 ൐ ߪ. ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻ 
is an unobservable demand shock for firm j selling in country n. A firm j enters market n 
by paying a fixed cost to establish a production plant: 
ܧ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ܧ௡௜ߝ௡ሺ݆ሻ        (4) 
where ܧ௡௜ is the general fixed cost that is constant for all firms such as administrative 
setup costs. ߝ௡ሺ݆ሻ is an idiosyncratic fixed cost specific to firm j entering market n. In 
this setting, firm j from country i will generate net profits in market n: 
ߨ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ 	 ቀ1 െ ௖೙೔ሺ௝ሻ௣೙ሺ௝ሻቁ ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻ ቀ
௣೙ሺ௝ሻ
௉೙ ቁ
ିሺఙିଵሻ ܺ௡ െ ܧ௡௜ߝ௡ሺ݆ሻ.  (5) 
With monopolistic competition and Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, each firm maximizes its 
profit by charging a constant markup ഥ݉ ൌ ߪ ሺߪ െ 1ሻ⁄  over its unit cost ܿ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ such 
that ݌௡ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ഥ݉ܿ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ. Its total gross profit is proportional to demand with a factor of 
1/ߪ, yielding ܺ௡ሺ݆ሻ/ߪ. Firm j will enter market n if and only if its operating profit is 
sufficient to overcome the fixed entry cost: 
ߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ ቀ௣೙ሺ௝ሻ௉೙ ቁ
ିሺఙିଵሻ ௑೙
ఙ ൒ ܧ௡௜      (6) 
where ߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ ൌ 	ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻ 	ߝ௡ሺ݆ሻൗ  is an entry shock to firm j that invests in market n.  
 From equation (6), the entry hurdle condition shows that firm j in country i enters 
the market if and only if its unit cost is less than the threshold entry cost: 
ܿ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ ൑ ܿ௡̅௜ሺ݆ሻ         (7) 
where: 
ܿ௡̅௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ቀߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ ௑೙ఙா೙೔ቁ
ଵ/ሺఙିଵሻ ௉೙
௠ഥ .     (8) 
A lower value of ܿ௡̅௜ሺ݆ሻ indicates a less attractive market for multinational production. 
Substituting the constant markup price and equation (8) into equation (3), we express 
the latent sales conditional on entry: 
ܺ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ఈ೙ሺ௝ሻఎ೙ሺ௝ሻ 	ߪܧ௡௜	ቀ
௖೙̅೔ሺ௝ሻ
௖೙ሺ௝ሻቁ
ఙିଵ
.     (9) 
Conditional on entry, equation (9) dictates the volume of sales by firms in that market. 
Equations (7), (8), and (9) provide the main predictions about the structure of 
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heterogeneous multinational firms. That is, more productive firms are more likely than 
less productive firms to: (i) invest in a larger number of markets, (ii) penetrate the less 
attractive markets, and (iii) yield larger sales per market. 
To conduct counterfactuals, we modify the general equilibrium in EKK (2011) to set 
up a model in which producers serve their home country by domestic production and 
foreign countries through FDI. The general equilibrium is set up such that 
manufacturing production and consumption across countries are connected through FDI 
activity. Equilibrium in the world market for manufacturers leads to a system of 
equations, which allows us to solve for changes in wages and prices from an exogenous 
change in variable and fixed FDI costs. We calculate welfare changes as measured by 
real wages because of adjustments in aggregate prices and wages. 
 
3. Discussions on Investment Barriers 
 Drawing on the methodological framework in section 2, we conduct a series of 
counterfactual experiments. While simple extreme scenarios are global prohibition and 
no friction of multinational production, a comparison of these cases does not yield 
practical policy implications. To make an analysis relevant for policy discussions, we 
discuss investment barriers and identify policy-related frictions for FDI activity. 
 
3.1. Policy-Related Investment Costs 
 To design counterfactual scenarios relevant for policy issues, we first need to 
identify crucial barriers to foreign investment. As is well known, foreign firms take into 
account a wide range of factors in making direct investment, including not only 
investment costs related to institutional and regulatory barriers but the market size, 
factor endowments, transport costs, infrastructure quality, macroeconomic stability, and 
so on. Empirical evidence for these FDI determinants has been shown in a large number 
of previous studies (Blonigen, 2005; Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). Among 
alternative determinants, market-seeking and efficiency-seeking motives constitute a 
fundamental incentive for multinational firms in manufacturing to make direct 
investment in a foreign market (Markusen, 2002). This suggests that the first-order 
determinants of FDI would be the potential market size and production costs in a host 
country. However, these market characteristics improve only in the long term and do not 
change in the short term. The analysis of these determinants helps us to see policy 
implications from the long-run perspective but sheds little light on the plausible policy 
reforms that can be implemented in the short term. 
In contrast to the previous literature, this paper focuses exclusively on institutional 
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and policy-oriented barriers that are specific to foreign investors but less relevant for 
domestic investors in the economy. Thus, this approach places less emphasis on the 
overall investment climate in the market that influences investment and production 
decisions both by domestic firms and by foreign firms. For example, Dollar et al. (2005) 
define the investment climate as the institutional, policy, and regulatory environment in 
which firms operate, and they investigate the impact of investment climate on firm 
performance in developing economies. Specifically, they use the World Bank surveys to 
highlight the public services provided by the governments for firms: export/import 
clearance times, the reliability of power supply, and telecommunications set-up times. 
As investigated by Kinda (2010), these factors are apparently crucial for multinational 
activity, and a broad measure of investment barriers is useful for understanding 
aggregate impacts on multinational production. However, the broad measure of 
investment impediments is likely to affect both domestic and foreign firms, making it 
difficult to address what specific factors deter FDI inflows. 
 In this paper, we analyze a removal of policy-related restrictions on foreign 
investors in order to clearly understand what policy reforms are necessary to reduce 
investment distortions. In this respect, our approach is similar to the prior study by 
Waglé (2011) on the institutional determinants of FDI, but it differs in that we adopt a 
structural method to investigate the impact of institutional barriers on individual firms. 
Similar to Petri et al. (2011), we employ estimates of FDI retrieved outside the model, 
but we base our measures off of actual policy information rather than frontier 
investment reference. Additionally, Gormsen (2011) estimates the unobservable barriers 
to FDI from the observed data on FDI stocks. Conceptually, his measure of FDI barriers 
represents the relative attractiveness of holding foreign capital as perceived by a 
domestic firm in comparison with domestic capital. Compared to his measure, we focus 
on more specific FDI barriers. 
 
3.2. Fixed FDI Costs and Investment Procedures 
 As discussed in the preceding section, we focus on policy-related investment costs 
among alternative investment barriers for multinationals. To design a hypothetical 
scenario consistent with our theoretical model, we further need to connect specific 
investment barriers to the fixed and variable costs of FDI activity. To this end, we first 
discuss fixed FDI costs in this section. 
 Equation (4) of the model shows that individual firms pay fixed costs to start 
foreign production and incur additional fixed costs as compared with local firms in a 
host market. For counterfactual analysis, we need to measure such entry barriers 
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specific to foreign investors. In this respect, the World Bank’s Investing Across Borders 
(IAB) project provides useful quantitative measures of FDI barriers. The IAB survey 
provides comparable indicators across countries for (1) foreign ownership restrictions 
across sectors, (2) starting a foreign business, (3) accessing industrial land, and (4) 
arbitrating commercial disputes. The survey data were obtained from over 2,350 local 
experts and practitioners in 87 economies between April and December 2009. 
 Because we focus exclusively on manufacturing multinational firms, an indicator of 
ownership restrictions in manufacturing seems to be a good candidate for analysis. 
However, the index exhibits little variation across economies, suggesting that 
manufacturing foreign firms are generally allowed to establish their own foreign 
subsidiary and acquire domestically-owned firms. Thus, we conclude that ownership 
restrictions are not likely to be a significant barrier for manufacturing multinationals. 
Alternatively, an obvious entry barrier pertains to the process for establishing a foreign 
subsidiary by multinational firms. Among others, it is useful to employ indicators on 
starting a foreign business.3 According to the IAB report, foreign companies need, on 
average, 14 more days and require 2 more procedures than domestic companies. 
Specifically, we use the number of procedure days required by foreign firms to 
quantitatively assess the impact on multinational activities that results from more equal 
treatment of domestic and foreign investors, simplification of establishment procedures 
for foreign firms, and streamlining of foreign investment approvals. 
 To link a specific measure of FDI regulation with fixed FDI costs, ܧ௡௜, we use the 
following equation from the modified version of the EKK model: 
ߪܧ௡௜ ൌ ߢଶߢଵିଵ തܺ௡௜.        (10) 
Taking logs and rearranging the above equation, we have the log of average affiliate 
sales by multinationals from home country i in host country n as a function of ln ܧ௡௜ 
and other parameters. We then assume that ln ܧ௡௜ depends on the number of procedure 
days for foreign investors, Day, with an error term: 
ln ܧ௡௜ ൌ ߤ଴ ൅ ߤଵܦܽݕ௡ ൅ ߝ௡௜.       (11) 
Using the equations (10) and (11), we specify the log of തܺ௡௜ as a function of days: 
ln തܺ௡௜ ൌ ߤ଴ ൅ ߤଵܦܽݕ௡ ൅ ߛܼᇱ ൅ ߝ௡௜.      (12) 
where ܼ  is a set of control variables, including GDP, GDP per capita, distance, 
geographic contiguity, common language, regional trade agreements, and home-country 
                                                  
3 According to the IAB report, procedural steps include pre- and post-incorporation procedures that 
are officially required for a foreign investor to formally establish a wholly-owned subsidiary. For 
instance, the ease of establishing a company depends on restrictions on the composition of the board 
of directors, an official channel to expedite establishment procedures, restrictions on holding a 
foreign currency commercial bank account, and availability of electronic services. 
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fixed effects. By estimating the above specification, we can infer a relationship between 
the procedure days and fixed costs of FDI. 
 For estimation, we construct data on average affiliate sales using the number of 
foreign affiliates and their sales across home and host countries as reported in the 
OECD Globalisation Database. To supplement the data on average affiliate sales, we 
also use data from the U.S. BEA and Japanese RIETI. Data on the control variables 
come from the CEPII Gravity Dataset complied by Head et al. (2010). After 
constructing the dataset, our sample consists of 212 observations. The variable of 
procedure days in the sample has a mean of 39.2 and a standard deviation of 37.1, 
ranging from 6 days to 179 days.  
Based on the sample, we estimate specification (12) by OLS. We find that the 
coefficient of Day is 0.0031 with a robust standard error of 0.0018, implying that the 
length of investment procedures in a host market has a significantly positive association 
with the average sales of foreign affiliates. Using the estimated coefficient, we compute 
the elasticity of ܧ௡௜ with respect to a change in the procedure days. For example, a fall 
in the procedure length by 10 days should lead to a decline in fixed FDI costs by 3.15% 
(=100 ൈ ሾሺexpሺ0.0031 ൈ 10ሻ െ 1ሿሻ . In the following counterfactual scenarios, we 
compute the corresponding percentage change for each country.  
 
3.3. Variable FDI Costs and Corporate Tax Rates 
 We turn to examine variable FDI costs. According to the model, individual firms 
incur variable costs in the iceberg form of efficiency loss from operating their plant in a 
foreign market. Among alternative factors to determine the efficiency loss, taxation on 
FDI is apparently a policy-related impediment to the efficient management of local 
production by multinationals. As governments in developing economies impose a 
variety of taxes, a reduction of foreign tax rates is a useful policy experiment. 
 For this task, we first construct effective corporate taxes imposed on foreign firms. 
Following Burnstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009), we use the data on U.S. multinational 
companies from the U.S. BEA to compute an effective tax rate applied to foreign 
affiliates by U.S. multinationals. As is explained in Desai et al. (2004), the taxes levied 
on multinationals include not only corporate income taxes but also indirect foreign taxes 
including sales taxes, value-added taxes, and property taxes. To capture the overall 
effective tax rates in each host country, the effective tax rate is calculated as: 
ܶܽݔ ൌ 	 ୤୭୰ୣ୧୥୬	୧୬ୡ୭୫ୣ	୲ୟ୶ୣୱ	ା୧୬ୢ୧୰ୣୡ୲	୤୭୰ୣ୧୥୬	୲ୟ୶୬ୣ୲	୤୭୰ୣ୧୥୬	୧୬ୡ୭୫ୣା	୤୭୰ୣ୧୥୬	୧୬ୡ୭୫ୣ	୲ୟ୶ୣୱ	ା୧୬ୢ୧୰ୣୡ୲	୤୭୰ୣ୧୥୬	୲ୟ୶.    (13) 
In the following analysis, we assume that the effective tax rates of U.S. multinationals 
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also apply to the multinationals originating from other home countries.4 
 To relate effective corporate tax rates with variable FDI barriers,	݀௡௜, we use the 
following equation from the model: 
	௑೙೔
௑೙ ൌ
்೔ሺ௪೙ௗ೙೔ሻషഇሺ௖ሻഇ
஍೙           (14) 
where c and Φ௡ are parameters. Taking logs and rearranging the equation, we specify 
the log of ܺ௡௜ as a function of variable costs and other variables. We assume that the 
log of variable costs of production in host country n by multinationals from home 
country i is a function of the effective corporate tax rates with an error term: 
ln ݀௡௜ ൌ ߣ଴ ൅ ߣଵܶܽݔ௡ ൅ ݑ௡௜.      (15) 
The coefficient of Tax, ߣଵ, is needed to quantify a percentage change in variable cost 
from decreasing effective the tax rates. However, the above equation is not estimable for 
the lack of observed data on variable costs. Thus, we re-specify the relationship between 
ܺ௡௜ and ݀௡௜ as: 
ln ܺ௡௜ ൌ ߣ଴ െ ߠߣଵܶܽݔ௡௜ ൅ ܼ߰ᇱ ൅ ݑ௡௜     (16) 
where ܼ  is a set of control variables, including GDP, GDP per capita, distance, 
geographic contiguity, common language, colonial relationships, legal origins, 
GATT/WTO membership, regional trade agreements, and home-country fixed effects.5  
 For estimation, we construct the sample with 2,402 observations using data on 
affiliate sales in 2006 from the Japanese RIETI and UNCTAD.6 The effective corporate 
tax rates have a mean of 0.40 and a standard deviation of 0.17, ranging from 0.02 to 
0.70. Based on the sample, we estimate the coefficient of Tax by OLS. The OLS 
estimate is -1.02 with a robust standard error of 0.30, which is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Consistent with our intuition, foreign affiliate sales are systematically 
lower in the countries with higher effective tax rates.  
To obtain an estimate for ߣଵ , we need to calculate ߣଵ ൌ 1.02 ߠ⁄ . Using the 
estimate for an elasticity of substitution from Kang (2008) and the estimated size 
dispersion of Japanese multinationals, we obtain 2.37 for ߠ.7 This implies that the 
elasticity of variable costs with respect to the foreign tax rate is 0.43 (=1.02 2.37⁄ ሻ. For 
instance, a 10% increase in the tax rate is associated with an increase in the variable 
costs by 4.39% (= 100 ൈ ሾሺexpሺ0.43 ൈ 0.10ሻ െ 1ሿሻ. In the following, we calculate the 
                                                  
4 Since some developing countries are not included in the BEA data, we replace missing figures 
with either regional effective foreign taxes or nearest neighbor tax rates from the same data. These 
countries include Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Pakistan, Turkey, and Vietnam.  
5 Additional control variables from the CEPII Gravity Dataset are included for the larger sample 
size when bilateral affiliate sales are used as the dependent variable. 
6 See Appendix B. 
7 We compute ߠ	 ൌ ߠ෨ሺߪ െ 1ሻ ൌ 1.99ሺ2.19 െ 1ሻ. See Appendix A1 for estimation of ߠ෨. 
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corresponding percentage drop in variable costs for each country. 
 
3.4. Counterfactual Scenarios 
 We consider the four scenarios of counterfactual policy experiments as summarized 
in Table 1. We set up the policy experiment (1) to reduce barriers for foreign firms in 
developing economies to the level of their domestic firms and (2) to eliminate 
impediments for the foreign firms to the level of developed economies. We consider that 
these experiments are applied to either fixed or variable costs of foreign production by 
multinational firms. A specific change in these costs is computed using the elasticity of 
fixed and variable FDI costs with respect to investment procedure days and effective 
corporate tax rates, respectively. Throughout counterfactual experiments, we keep 
domestic production barriers within a country fixed. 
=== Table 1 === 
 We consider the policy experiment in which governments in developing economies 
reduce the length of investment procedures for foreign investors. We assume that the 
governments reduce the approval days for foreign firms to the level that applies to 
domestic firms in their economies, which can be called a “level-playing-field” policy. 
As is explained previously, we use the actual approval days for foreign firms from the 
Investing-Across-Borders (IAB) of the World Bank. For a comparable measure of 
business restrictions on domestic firms, we employ the days for starting a business from 
the Doing Business Indicator (DBI) of the World Bank.8 We subtract the IAB figures 
from the DBI figures to measure the magnitude of reductions in FDI-specific barriers in 
developing countries. As the DBI measure exceeds the IAB measure for Bangladesh, 
Malaysia, and Peru, we assume that these countries have not redued the FDI-specific 
barriers. Thus, we compute the length of eliminating procedure days for multinationals, 
which the governments in developing economies must target to implement the 
“level-playing-field” policy. Drawing on the estimated elasticity in section 3.2., we 
compute the corresponding percentage change in fixed FDI costs for each country in 
column (1) of Table 2. 
=== Table 2 === 
 For the second policy experiment, we presume that governments in developing 
economies aim for a higher level of investment liberalization by reducing the FDI 
procedure days to the level of developed economies; we call this a “catching-up” policy. 
In this experiment, we assume that the developing economies eliminate procedure days 
                                                  
8 We estimate the FDI procedure days for Laos from a simple regression of the IAB measures on the 
DBI measures. 
13 
 
for foreign investors to correspond to those of developed economies. According to the 
IAB report, foreign firms require, on average, 20 days for their investment approval in 
the developed countries, which we take as the catch-up target for developing economies. 
Thus, we subtract the IAB figures from 20 days to calculate the length of procedure 
reduction necessary to eliminate FDI-specific barriers. As is the case in the first scenario, 
we make no change for the economies in which the IAB measures are smaller than 20. 
Finally, the corresponding percentage change in fixed FDI costs is also shown in 
column (2) of Table 2. 
 We turn to examine variable FDI costs in the third scenario, where governments in 
developing economies reduce effective tax rates for foreign firms to the level of their 
domestic firms. For the effective tax rate applied to domestic firms, we follow Burstein 
and Monge-Naranjo (2009) and set the rate at 29%, which is the average effective tax 
rate relevant to investment decisions. We subtract the effective tax rate of U.S. 
multinationals from the average effective tax rate to compute the amount of tax 
reductions necessary for the level-playing-field policy. Since the tax rate for foreign 
firms is lower in China and Malaysia, we keep these countries’ tax rates fixed. We 
calculate the corresponding percentage change in variable FDI costs as shown in 
column (3) of Table 2. 
 Finally, the fourth policy experiment is to reduce the effective tax rate of foreign 
firms to the level of developed economies. From our data on tax rates, the average 
effective tax applied to U.S. multinationals in developed economies is 32.5%. Thus, the 
effective tax rate for foreign firms is reduced to the tax rate of 32.5%, which is a slightly 
more moderate policy target relative to the third experiment. We replace zeros for the 
countries in which the tax rate on FDI is lower than 32.5%, including China, India, and 
Malaysia. The corresponding percentage change in variable costs is shown in column 
(4) of Table 2. 
 
4. Counterfactual Results 
 We proceed to quantify the aggregate and firm-level consequences of eliminating 
barriers to multinational production in developing economies. Conducting a series of 
counterfactual simulations, we discuss the quantitative implications of counterfactual 
changes from the benchmark simulation. 
 
4.1. Welfare and Aggregate Multinational Production 
 Table 3 presents the general equilibrium changes in real wages across developing 
economies resulting from their investment liberalization. For each experiment, we 
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compute a proportion of nominal price changes relative to nominal wage changes in 
order to estimate the aggregate welfare impacts. We find that the real wages increase for 
some developing economies and decline for others. For instance, the economies such as 
the Philippines, South Africa, and Vietnam experience a welfare gain across different 
policy experiments. These economies are commonly distinctive in that their 
policy-related barriers are relatively high, translating into a relatively large reduction of 
fixed and variable FDI costs. Because there is a large inflow of foreign multinational 
firms to these markets, foreign firms increase demand for local labor, which in turn 
pushes up nominal wages. At the same time, more efficient multinational firms increase 
production at lower marginal costs, leading to a steep decline in price levels. These two 
forces combine to generate a relatively large increase in real wages for these countries. 
=== Table 3 === 
 By contrast, economies such as Chile, Malaysia, and Mexico are already open to 
foreign investors, and their reduction of policy-related investment barriers is relatively 
negligible in the policy experiments. This implies that these markets become less 
attractive for multinational firms compared with the other developing economies that 
substantially eliminate FDI barriers. As a result, the counterfactual real wages relative to 
the baseline ones do not increase sufficiently as compared with the counterfactual prices 
relative to baseline prices. This would lead to a modest loss of welfare for these 
countries, as shown in Table 3. 
Additionally, the average reduction of fixed FDI costs is larger in scenario (2) than 
in scenario (1). We find that the former experiment shows relatively larger welfare gains 
across economies. Also, the average decline of variable FDI costs is greater in scenario 
(3) than in scenario (4), with the former having the slightly larger welfare gains on 
average. These results suggest that welfare gains from investment liberalization in 
developing economies are likely to increase following more significant policy reforms 
in investment barriers. 
 Following the general equilibrium changes in wages and prices, we compute 
aggregate changes in entry and sales by artificial multinational firms. By focusing on 
foreign affiliates in developing economies, we present the baseline and counterfactual 
changes in Table 4. In the baseline, the total firm entry into developing countries is 
5,397, with 257 entries per market on average. Total affiliate sales in these markets 
amount to 38.4 trillion yen, with average sales per market of 1.83 trillion yen. Across 
the policy experiments, the increase in firm entry is the largest for scenario (2); when 
governments in developing economies reduce investment procedure days to the level of 
developed economies, there will be 1,181 additional firm entries from Japan. By 
15 
 
contrast, the increase in firm entry is 168 in scenario (3) and 120 in scenario (4), which 
involve a reduction of effective tax rates on foreign firms in developing economies. 
These changes are significantly smaller as compared to scenarios (1) and (2), which 
involve an elimination of investment procedures.  
=== Table 4 === 
 We find that total affiliate sales increase substantially following the large reduction 
in investment procedure length in the policy experiment (2). Developing economies 
would experience an increase of 0.31 trillion yen in average sales of foreign affiliates 
per market. In contrast, the aggregate affiliate sales increase much less in policy 
scenario (1) mainly because of less significant reforms in the investment procedures. In 
contrast, the average affiliate sales in developing countries increase by 0.10 trillion yen 
in scenarios (3) and (4). These resulting increases are smaller than the impacts found 
from the fixed costs reductions in scenarios (1) and (2). Taken together, these results 
suggest that policy reforms in investment procedures could be more effective than the 
provision of fiscal incentives to foreign firms to attract foreign investment and promote 
their local production. 
 
4.2. Firm-level Impacts at the Extensive Margin 
 Having analyzed the aggregate impacts, we proceed to shed light on firm 
heterogeneity in the counterfactual results. Specifically, we decompose the aggregate 
changes in multinational activity into firm-level changes at the extensive and intensive 
margin. First, we aggregate all the entries to developing countries across initial 
productivity groups in the baseline.  
Table 5 shows the extensive margin of the baseline and counterfactual percentage 
changes from the baseline. The baseline shows that more productive firms are more 
likely than less productive firms to establish foreign production in developing 
economies, as is consistent with the findings in Yeaple (2009); more productive U.S. 
multinationals tend to penetrate less attractive foreign markets. In particular, the top 
30% of firms account for 86.7% of the total entries, whereas the bottom 30% account 
for only 2.6%. The highest productivity firms are crucial for developing economies.  
=== Table 5 === 
 Decomposing the aggregate counterfactual changes at the extensive margin, we find 
strikingly distinctive patterns across productivity groups. Throughout scenarios (1)-(4), 
firms in the lowest productivity group tend to close down their foreign affiliates. 
Despite the decline in investment costs, more intensive competition in developing 
economies drives out foreign production by these low productive firms. 
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In scenarios (1) and (2), middle productive firms increase their entry into 
developing economies more substantially than high productive firms. Moreover, 
lower-middle productive firms are more likely than upper-middle productive firms to 
establish new foreign affiliates more prominently in developing economies in the wake 
of policy reforms in investment procedures. The reason is that, among potential 
producers below the cutoff productivity, the relatively high productive firms tend to 
overcome entry barriers in a wide range of markets in the wake of declining entry costs. 
Additionally, the top 1% of firms also increase their entry into developing economies, 
but their growth is relatively modest. An explanation is that they have already served 
multiple markets and experience more intensified market competition in foreign markets 
resulting from the new entry of multinationals. 
Finally, scenarios (3) and (4) indicate that a decrease in variable costs tends to 
discourage the entry of less productive firms but encourages that of more productive 
firms. These results indicate that a decline in corporate tax rates mainly affects the 
operational costs of foreign production, making the extensive-margin impact less 
clear-cut.  
 
4.3. Firm-level Impacts at the Intensive Margin 
 Table 6 presents the results for the intensive margin of foreign affiliates in 
developing economies. It is evident from the baseline that more productive firms exhibit 
larger foreign production per market. The average volume of local production is 
remarkably large for the top 1% of firms. Their average foreign production is 
approximately 24 billion yen, more than 100 times larger than the bottom 10% of firms. 
These patterns suggest that the most productive firms account for the majority of local 
production by foreign firms in developing economies. 
=== Table 6 === 
 Columns (1) to (4) in Table 6 show the counterfactual changes at the intensive 
margin from the baseline. In policy experiments (1) and (2), the intensive margin 
increases for all the firms, with a relatively large percentage increase for low and middle 
productive firms. This implies that these firms are likely to benefit from improvement in 
the inefficient processes of investment approval. On the other hand, the most productive 
firms face increased competition from the new entry of multinational firms, and the 
competition effects mitigate an increase in their foreign production. Another reason for 
their modest growth is that they had already penetrated many foreign markets prior to 
investment liberalization, which attenuates the impact of falling entry barriers. 
In scenarios (3) and (4), the majority of the firms across productivity groups 
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experience a decline in the average volume of their foreign production. By contrast, 
firms in the top 1% experience a relatively large increase in the average level of their 
offshore production. Given their large share of total production, these small percentage 
changes – 5% to 7% intensive-margin growth – lead to very large aggregate changes in 
foreign production. Since a reduction in effective tax rates primarily affects the 
intensive margin, the largest, most efficient firms, which have already paid the initial 
fixed entry costs, expand disproportionately relative to smaller, less efficient firms. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 Governments in developing economies have recently made substantial efforts to 
attract foreign investment. Prior empirical studies have investigated the impact of 
eliminating investment barriers against FDI activity but have paid little attention to how 
individual firms would respond to an aggregate reduction of investment costs. In this 
paper, we employ a structural approach to simulate the firm-level responses of 
multinational production to a series of counterfactual policy changes. To design a 
practical policy experiment, we link the theoretical measures of variable and fixed costs 
of multinational production with actual survey measures of investment procedures and 
effective tax rates faced by multinationals. Thus, we employ the more practical level of 
policy reforms toward foreign investors in counterfactual analysis. 
 Counterfactual reductions in investment barriers produce a set of interesting 
changes in welfare and multinational production. Developing economies tend to 
experience a large welfare gain for a substantial elimination of investment costs because 
entries of foreign multinationals increase demand for local labor and intensify market 
competition in host markets. These forces combine to magnify an increase in real wages. 
However, other developing countries that implement small policy reforms may 
experience a welfare loss because their markets are likely to become less attractive for 
foreign multinationals. As these simulations are based on various assumptions that 
abstract away from the real world, we must carefully interpret these results. 
Nevertheless, our result is consistent with the study in Baldwin et al. (1996) on the 
investment creation and diversion effects of the European Single Market Programme.  
 Our work demonstrates that firm heterogeneity is a crucial point of policy 
consideration for investment-promotion strategy because individual firms respond 
differently to reduction in investment barriers. While the level of elimination of 
investment barriers is uniform for all firms, more productive firms are more likely than 
less productive firms to conduct direct investment and expand local production in 
developing economies in terms of the absolute volume. Policy reform of investment 
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procedure requirements appears to be more effective than tax reductions for attracting 
new direct investment. By contrast, tax reductions tend to magnify the intensive margin 
of the larger multinationals that have already penetrated multiple markets. These results 
suggest implications for the potential importance of targeting in the provision of 
investment incentives because foreign multinationals will respond differently to new 
investment opportunities.  
 Finally, we must recognize that our application of requirements for investment 
procedures as fixed costs and tax reductions as variable costs are hypothetical in nature. 
Certain procedures required for foreign investment may also inflict variable costs, while 
taxes also contain different vehicles (such as entry subsidies) that can affect fixed costs 
and entry. Additionally, our finding of the differences across policy-specific barriers 
points to the need for further econometric work to examine these impacts across firms. 
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Table 1. Summary of Counterfactual Policy Experiments 
  Counterfactual Policy Scenario 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fixed Cost 
Reduce the average number 
of approval days for foreign 
firms in developing 
economies to the average 
level faced by domestic 
firms. 
Reduce the average number 
of approval days for foreign 
firms in developing 
economies to the average 
level faced in developed 
economies. 
Constant Constant 
Variable Cost Constant Constant 
Reduce the average effective 
tax rate for foreign firms in 
developing economies to the 
average level faced by 
domestic firms. 
Reduce the average effective 
tax rate for foreign firms in 
developing economies to the 
average level of developed 
economies. 
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Table 2. Hypothetical Reductions in FDI Barriers 
Economy Income Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fixed Cost Variable Cost 
Argentina Upper middle 6.07  9.75  15.60  13.87  
Brazil Upper middle 4.44  57.24  11.21  9.55  
Chile Upper middle 0.62  2.83  2.45  0.91  
Malaysia Upper middle 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Mexico Upper middle 0.93  3.47  3.37  1.83  
Peru Upper middle 0.00  7.39  4.46  2.90  
Russian Federation Upper middle 0.31  3.47  6.39  4.80  
South Africa Upper middle 14.26  14.97  14.41  12.70  
Turkey Upper middle 0.62  0.00  13.78  12.08  
China Lower middle 19.70  27.75  0.00  0.00  
Egypt Lower middle 0.31  0.00  7.36  5.76  
India Lower middle 5.09  8.39  1.43  0.00  
Indonesia Lower middle 3.15  22.70  1.56  0.04  
Pakistan Lower middle 0.00  0.31  1.56  0.04  
Philippines Lower middle 8.73  20.44  7.91  6.29  
Thailand Lower middle 0.31  4.44  10.61  8.96  
Vietnam Lower middle 14.61  25.78  11.36  9.69  
Bangladesh Low 0.00  11.46  1.56  0.04  
Cambodia Low 0.31  22.70  11.36  9.69  
Laos Low 6.76  36.81  11.36  9.69  
Myanmar Low 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Average 4.11  13.33  6.56  5.18  
Notes: Figures indicate a percentage point change in fixed costs for (1) and (2) and in variable costs for 
(3) and (4); income group is based on the World Bank list of economies as of September 2010; income 
levels are $995 or less for low income, $996–$3,945 for lower middle income, and $3,946–$12,195 for 
upper middle income.  
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Table 3. Real Wage Changes in Developing Economies 
Economy (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Argentina 0.995  1.001  1.054  1.046  
Brazil 0.998  1.048  1.021  1.017  
Chile 0.959  0.966  0.976  0.965  
Malaysia 0.953  0.953  0.953  0.953  
Mexico 0.987  0.991  0.996  0.992  
Peru 0.984  0.993  0.997  0.993  
Russian Federation 0.987  0.988  0.990  0.989  
South Africa 1.009  1.010  1.040  1.034  
Turkey 0.994  0.993  1.034  1.029  
China 1.011  1.036  0.954  0.952  
Egypt 0.984  0.984  1.001  0.997  
India 0.996  0.997  0.995  0.994  
Indonesia 0.972  0.989  0.973  0.969  
Pakistan 0.995  0.995  0.998  0.995  
Philippines 1.006  1.026  1.025  1.018  
Thailand 0.960  0.974  1.055  1.039  
Vietnam 1.011  1.047  1.058  1.044  
Bangladesh 0.995  1.000  0.996  0.995  
Cambodia 0.991  1.059  1.080  1.066  
Laos 0.999  1.022  1.016  1.013  
Myanmar 0.994  0.994  0.994  0.994  
Average 0.990  1.003  1.010  1.004  
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Table 4. Total Entries and Sales of Foreign Affiliates in Developing Economies 
  
Baseline 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Counterfactual Change from Baseline 
Total entries 5,397 568 1,181 168 120
(10.5) (21.9) (3.1) (2.2) 
Mean of entries per market 257 27 56 8 6 
(10.5) (21.8) (3.1) (2.3) 
Total sales 38.4 2.86 6.56 2.00 2.03 
(7.4) (17.1) (5.2) (5.3) 
Mean of sales per market 1.83 0.14 0.31 0.10 0.10 
  (7.4) (17.1) (5.2) (5.3) 
Notes: Figures in parentheses represent the percentage changes; affiliate sales are in trillions of 
yen. 
 
 
Table 5. Extensive Margin of Foreign Affiliates in Developing Economies 
Initial Productivity 
Group (percentile) 
Baseline 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Counterfactual Percentage Change from Baseline 
0-10 36 -61.1 -58.3 -25.0 -38.9 
10-20 45 -17.8 -2.2 -8.9 -11.1 
20-30 58 41.4 50.0 -6.9 -8.6 
30-40 77 44.2 76.6 -9.1 -7.8 
40-50 107 42.1 72.0 0.9 -5.6 
50-60 153 34.0 64.7 2.0 -2.0 
60-70 240 28.3 48.8 0.4 3.8 
70-80 403 22.8 39.7 1.7 -0.7 
80-90 814 15.4 25.7 2.1 2.6 
90-99 2,446 4.9 14.3 4.9 3.0 
99-100 1,018 0.6 7.2 1.2 2.7 
Note: The baseline figures indicate the cumulative number of markets penetrated by all the 
firms in the corresponding productivity group. 
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Table 6. Intensive Margin of Foreign Affiliates in Developing Economies 
Initial Productivity 
Group (percentile) 
Baseline 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Counterfactual Percentage Change from Baseline 
0-10 189.8 39.3 71.1 -8.4 15.4 
10-20 215.1 25.5 108.5 -1.5 -1.8 
20-30 234.9 19.5 42.0 -5.9 3.4 
30-40 276.1 33.0 38.7 -9.6 -21.7
40-50 344.0 24.2 39.9 -11.6 -8.1 
50-60 422.9 30.2 37.1 -4.2 -14.1 
60-70 582.5 27.0 40.4 -15.1 -20.7 
70-80 852.0 19.7 23.7 -10.4 -14.2 
80-90 1478.7 15.2 23.3 -7.9 -6.2 
90-99 4820.2 11.0 7.2 -2.9 -1.1 
99-100 24348.7 0.1 3.3 6.5 5.1 
Notes: The baseline figures indicate the average sales of foreign affiliates in developing 
economies across the corresponding productivity group; intensive margin is in millions of yen. 
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Appendix A 
A1. Calibration 
 To calibrate the model, the entry and sales conditions are re-specified. To isolate the 
heterogeneous component of unit costs, we define standardized unit costs as follow: 
ݑሺ݆ሻ ൌ ௜ܶݖ௜ሺ݆ሻିఏ .       (A1) 
By connecting the country-level parameters in equation (8) with the total number of 
firm entries ௡ܰ௜, we express the entry hurdle as follows: 
ݑሺ݆ሻ ൑ ݑത௡௜൫ߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ൯ ൌ ௡ܰ௜ߢଶିଵߟ௡ሺ݆ሻఏ෩ ,    (A2) 
where ߠ෨ 	ൌ 	ߠ ሺߪ െ 1ሻ⁄ ൐ 1 and ߢଶ ൌ ׬ ߟఏ෩ ݃ଶሺߟሻ݀ߟ. ݑത௡௜ሺ∙ሻ is a standardized entry 
hurdle in market n for potential producer j in country i. ߠ෨	is the heterogeneity in 
observed sales, with a lower value indicating a larger dispersion in sales across firms. 
Conditional on entry, the sales condition for firm j in market n is rewritten as 
ܺ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ఈ೙ሺ௝ሻఎ೙ሺ௝ሻ Xഥ௡௜
఑మ
఑భ ൫߭௡௜ሺ݆ሻ൯
ିଵ ఏ෩ൗ ,      (A3) 
where Xഥ௡௜ is the average sales in market n of foreign affiliates by multinationals from 
country i, ߢ଴ ൌ ߠ෨ ൫ߠ෨ െ 1൯ൗ , and ߢଵ ൌ ߢ଴∬ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻߟ௡ሺ݆ሻሺఏ෩ିଵሻ ݃ሺߙ, ߟሻ݀ߙ݀. We assume 
that the parameter ߭௡௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ݑሺ݆ሻ ݑത௡௜൫ߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ൯⁄  follows a uniform distribution on ሾ0, 1ሿ.  
 To parameterize ߢଵ and ߢଶ, ݃ሺߙ, ߟሻ is assumed to be joint lognormal with zero 
means, variances (ߪఈ and ߪఎ), and correlation ߩ. Thus, we can express ߢଵ and ߢଶ as 
follow: 
ߢଵ ൌ ቂ ఏ෩ఏ෩ିଵቃ ݁ݔ݌ ൤
ఙഀାଶఘఙഀఙആ൫ఏ෩ିଵ൯ାఙആ൫ఏ෩ିଵ൯మ
ଶ ൨,    (A4) 
ߢଶ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ ൤൫ఏ
෩ఙആ൯మ
ଶ ൨.         (A5) 
Taken together, the entry and sales conditions are governed by four structural 
parameters: heterogeneity in observed sales ߠ෨, variance in sales ߪఈ, variance in entry 
shocks ߪఎ, and their correlation ߩ. We denote the set of these structural parameters as 
Θ ൌ ሺߠ෨, ߪఈ, ߪఎ, ߩሻ 
We estimate a set of optimal structural parameters by calibrating the model to match 
firm-level data in Japan. Specifically, we use microdata pertaining to the Basic Survey 
of Japanese Business Structure and Activities conducted by the Japanese Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), which covers all business firms with 50 
employees or more and capital of 30 million yen or more. To link foreign affiliate sales 
with Japanese parent firms, we use microdata pertaining to the Survey of Overseas 
Business Activities conducted by METI, which covers the multinational parent firms 
that are headquartered in Japan and own at least one foreign business enterprise. For 
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calibration, we primarily use the sample on multinational manufacturing firms in 2006, 
which consists of 2,032 parent firms with 7,626 foreign affiliates. However, the figures 
for domestic sales are missing for some parent firms, making it difficult to measure a 
linkage between domestic and foreign sales for them. After excluding these firms, we 
have 1,656 parent firms in the sample. 
 We employ the simulated method of moments for estimation. In the first step, we 
use the entry and sales conditions in equations (A2) and (A3) to simulate an artificial 
producer s by generating its efficiency draw ݑሺݏሻ, sales shock ߙ௡ሺݏሻ, and entry shock 
ߟ௡ሺݏሻ. With an initial guess for the structural parameters and aggregate data on Japanese 
multinationals, we produce a dataset of hypothetical firms, including the market entry 
and affiliate sales across markets. Second, we construct a set of moment conditions 
from simulated multinationals and actual Japanese multinationals. We define a vector of 
deviations between actual and hypothetical moments for outcome k: 
ݕሺΘሻ ൌ ݉௞ െ ෝ݉௞ሺΘሻ.      (A6) 
Following the theoretical implications, we choose four moment conditions: pecking 
order strings, affiliate sales distributions across markets, parent sales distribution in 
Japan, and multinational production intensity. Stacking a vector of moment conditions, 
we minimize the objective function with respect to the structural parameters as follows: 
Θ෡ ൌ argmin஀ሼሾ݉௞ െ ෝ݉௞ሺΘሻሿᇱ		ሾ݉௞ െ ෝ݉௞ሺΘሻሿ	ሽ.    (A7) 
 To mitigate the influence of noisier segments of the data, we exclude markets with 
less than 10 foreign affiliates from the estimation. The best fit is obtained for the 
following structural parameters with bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis:  
ߠ෨ ߪ௔ ߪఎ ߩ 
1.99 1.64 0.39 -0.62 
(0.43) (0.07) (0.31) (0.34) 
The parameters are quite similar in magnitude to the corresponding estimates for French 
exporters in EKK (2011). Additionally, we check the robustness of the benchmark 
estimates by estimating the parameters alternatively for all the markets, without the 
pecking order of entry from the moment conditions, and the data in 1996. These checks 
demonstrate the robustness of the benchmark estimates to the sample and moments. 
 
A2. Validation 
 To examine whether the calibrated model can be used to replicate real multinational 
activity reasonably well, we conduct internal and external validation of the model. 
Given the estimated parameters, we first simulate a new dataset of multinational activity 
and compare the simulated moments with the moments from the estimation sample. We 
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find a fairly good fit of the data between simulated and actual moments, suggesting that 
the model is able to closely replicate the in-sample moments of the actual data.  
However, the internal validation may not support the predictive power of the model 
about multinational activity in an environment with significantly different FDI barriers. 
For external validation, we reproduce out-of-sample predictions of Japanese 
multinational activities in 2006 with our parameters estimated on the 1996 data. Using 
the 2006 data to parameterize ௡ܰ௃ and Xഥ௡௃ with the 1996 parameter estimates, we 
simulate an artificial set of multinationals from the entry and sales conditions for 
simulated firm s as follow: 
ݑሺݏሻ ൑ ݑത௡൫ߟ௡ሺݏሻ൯ ൌ ௡ܰ௃ଶ଴଴଺ߢଶିଵߟ௡ሺݏሻఏ෩ ,     (A8) 
ܺ௡௃ሺݏሻ ൌ Xഥ௡௃ଶ଴଴଺ ఈ೙ሺ௦ሻఎ೙ሺ௦ሻ
఑మ
఑భ ቀ
௨ሺ௦ሻ
௨ഥ೙ሺ௦ሻቁ
ିଵ ఏ෩ൗ .      (A9) 
Comparing the number of simulated and actual firms according to the moment 
conditions, we find that the model fit is fairly good along various dimensions of 
multinational activities, such as the sales distribution across markets. 
 
A3. General Equilibrium 
 Each country is endowed with labor, which is mobile within countries, but immobile 
across countries. Intermediates are a Cobb-Douglas combination of labor and 
intermediates. Final output is non-traded and a Cobb-Douglas combination of 
manufactured goods and labor. Fixed cost for FDI is paid by labor. Profits accrue to the 
countries where producers’ headquarters are located. As consumers own equal shares of 
each firm headquartered in their country, the profits are redistributed equally among the 
consumers. A country’s GDP is equal to its total wages from production in its own 
country and its total profit from abroad. Lastly, some countries are net receivers of FDI, 
implying that they incur FDI deficits. 
Solving for prices and wages jointly, we calculate counterfactual changes in the 
entry and affiliate sales of Japanese firms across markets ෠ܺ௡௃஼  and ෡ܰ௡௃஼ . Given these 
counterfactual changes, we use the entry and sales conditions in equations (A2) and 
(A3) to specify the corresponding counterfactual conditions for firm-level behaviors as 
follow: 
ݑሺݏሻ ൑ ݑത௡௃஼ ൫ߟ௡ሺݏሻ൯ ൌ ௡ܰ௃஼ ߢଶିଵߟ௡ሺݏሻఏ෩ ,        (A10) 
ܺ௡௃஼ ሺݏሻ ൌ Xഥ௡௃஼ ሺݏሻ ఈ೙ሺ௝ሻఎ೙ሺ௝ሻ
఑మ
఑భ ቀ
௨ሺ௦ሻ
௨ഥ೙಴ሺ௦ሻቁ
ିଵ ఏ෩ൗ .        (A11) 
Holding the structural parameters fixed, we next simulate a set of artificial firms on the 
basis of equations (A10) and (A11). Throughout the counterfactuals, we fix productivity 
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draws and entry/sales shocks specific to each firm. Thus, all changes in firm-level 
activity relative to the baseline stem solely from a change in aggregate FDI barriers.  
 
Appendix B 
B1. Data Description 
We use the UNCTAD data on FDI stocks and flows for the period 1990-2006 to 
estimate foreign affiliate sales in 2006. First, we construct bilateral FDI stocks in 2006 
for each country pair, and we approximate missing figures by the cumulative stocks of 
FDI flows over 1990-2006. Negative figures of the estimated FDI stocks are replaced 
with zero. Second, we estimate total FDI stocks in manufacturing sectors by multiplying 
the figures by 21%; this is the average share of manufacturing FDI as reported in the 
World Investment Report (2010). Finally, we multiply the FDI stocks by 2.02 to convert 
into sales by foreign affiliates; this is the estimated relationship between FDI stocks and 
affiliate sales in the World Investment Report (2010). 
 
